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Pilot-to-pilot communication has been a major subject of study both within
the aviation industry and academia. Poor crew communication contributed to a
series of airplane accidents in the 1970s leading to regulatory authorities requiring
the implementation of a safety system known as Crew Resource Management
(CRM); “a human factors approach for improving aviation safety by preventing or
managing pilots' errors” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997, p. 4).
In the early years of CRM, the National Transportation Safety Board (1994)
published a safety study analyzing the cause of 36 accidents found that poor pilot
communication the most frequently cited error, contributing to cause or causal
factor in 90% of the errors. These findings led to the advancement and advocacy of
CRM throughout the industry.
Flight deck communication can be broken down into four categories: safety
voice (speaking up with safety concerns), safety listening (acknowledging safety
voice with verbal acknowledgment or action), muted safety voice (speaking up in
a hushed and hesitant way), and safety silence (remaining silent with safetyrelevant information) (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012, Noort et al., 2019/2021).
Over the next few decades, the industry saw a proliferation of CRM training
mandates for operators and individual pilots. All air carriers and charter certificate
holders became required to train their pilots on CRM (e.g., Federal Aviation
Regulations§ 121.404, § 121.419, §121.420, and §135.330) and all individual pilots
applying for an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) license or a type rating were required
to show proof they had undergone at least six hours of approved-course instruction
on CRM, safety culture, professional development, and leadership (Federal
Aviation Regulation § 61.155).
While all professional pilots are required to receive CRM training, there is
no regulation stipulating specific topics or a syllabus outline. Therefore, a pilot
from a Part 141 flight training academy may receive CRM training that looks quite
different from a pilot at a Part 61 flight school. Similarly, each airline can curate
and train CRM with a unique in-house training curriculum (albeit they must receive
Federal Aviation Administration approval) (Federal Aviation Administration,
2018, FAR§ 121.405).
In hopes of providing a method of compliance, the Federal Aviation
Administration published Advisory Circular 120-51E Crew Resource Management
Training in 2004(a) which offers suggested training topics, curriculum, and
observable behaviors for CRM best practices. The Advisory Circular lays a
framework for a potential industry-wide standardized curriculum.
Despite mandated CRM training programs and 18 years of a suggested
training framework, flight deck communication errors, such as safety silence,
persist (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Noort et al, 2021; Rankin, 2007). We approach
this problem in the current study by using industry pilot feedback to measure and
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analyze muted safety voice, quantify the frequency of safety silence, and explore
how the flight deck microculture impacts safety voice.
Power Distance and Safety Voice
Power distance is the measurement of the extent that society accepts the
inequitable distribution of power (Hofstede, 2011). In a high-power distance flight
deck, First Officers would be less likely to overtly challenge the power of the
Captain. Conversely, in low power distance flight decks, First Officers would be
more likely to speak up (safety voice) regarding safety-pertinent information
(Edmondson, 1999; Noort et al., 2021). This phenomenon was measured through
recent academic research (Noort et al., 2021) using 172 cockpit voice recorder
transcripts to conduct analytic coding of more than 14,000 conversational turns
from flight decks. The findings revealed that safety voice alone was insufficient in
circumnavigating communication errors; safety listening was also required (Noort
et al., 2021). Our research utilizes insight from industry pilots to question how
institutional power (Captain vs. First Officer) influences safety voice and safety
listening.
While there remains a hierarchy (and thus a permanence for institutional
power), CRM requires First Officers to speak up and mandates that Captains listen
(FAA, 2012; EUROCONTROL, 2022). In this regard, the system design either
assumes it provides adequate countermeasures to power-induced silencing or it
believes the flight deck to be an inclusive environment where safety voice is
welcomed. There is a disconnect between the ethos of CRM and how it is
operationalized within the flight deck. We argue that the next generation of
aviation’s human performance training must focus on system design flaws with
recommendations for a human-centered redesign.
Psychological Safety and Safety Voice
Psychological safety is defined as, “a shared belief held by members of a
team that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-taking” (Edmondson, 1999, p. 3).
In the microculture of the flight deck, this means that pilots feel comfortable sharing
ideas, admitting mistakes, and activating safety voice (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012;
Edmondson, 2018). Psychological safety has been an influential concept in highrisk work environments, such as healthcare, as academic research found that
psychologically safe teams were more open to speaking about mistakes made on
the hospital floor (Edmondson, 2018; O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 2020).
Given that CRM was designed to reduce and mitigate human error (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 1997), psychological safety may inform a
system design that could elicit safety voice to enhance aviation safety.
CRM does not specifically discuss psychological safety, but similar
concepts are found in the Federal Aviation Administration’s Crew Resource
Management Training Advisory Circular (2004a). Concepts such as, “how to
behave in ways that foster crew effectiveness” (p. 6), “interpersonal relationships”
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(p. 8), and “showing sensitivity to other crewmembers’ personalities and styles” (p.
11), emphasize the importance of creating a collaborative and inclusive
environment. These concepts align with the foundation of psychological safety. As
with healthcare, the aviation industry is a high-risk, safety-orientated environment
that would benefit from a focus on psychological safety as it pertains to safety voice
in the flight deck. Our contribution with this study is to find systemic opportunities
to enhance crew collaboration by utilizing direct feedback from industry pilots.
Self-Disclosure and Ethical Considerations
As a professional pilot, the first author has been trained and has more than
15 years of CRM experience. She has experienced the system as a First Officer and
a Captain and is now committed to enhancing aviation safety through humancentered design for prosocial, inclusive behavior and interpersonal skills. An initial
step in a system redesign is understanding the gaps. This research aims to
accomplish that using mixed method research to gather rich insight directly from
industry pilots.
Method
To explore our questions about the effectiveness of CRM, we conducted an
industry-wide survey of professional pilots in December 2021. The survey was
disseminated through social media and listservs of professional pilots, emphasizing
that participation was voluntary. The research was approved by the Institutional
Review Board at the University of Washington.
Design
The survey contained 34 questions, divided into 4 sections. In the first
section we asked for basic information related to the occupation, such as flight
experience in seat position (e.g., Captain or First Officer) and total flight time. We
gathered data on which certificate the pilots were operating (e.g., FAA Part 121,
135, or 91), and whether they were trained or operated in the United States. The
second section of the survey asked about pilots’ experience and familiarity with
CRM training and implementation. The third section concerned questions of safety,
asking about the company’s Safety Management System and the frequency and
perceived usefulness of safety reporting. We explored the frequency of muted
safety voice (in the form of hesitation) and safety silence. The final section
contained questions about the microculture of the flight deck. We specifically
focused on pilots’ perceived value in training interpersonal skills as a subset of
CRM training and inquired about ways to enhance team dynamics through
collaborative behaviorism.
The survey received a total of 822 responses from Captains and First
Officers across the industry. In this paper, we focus broadly on responses to the
following questions:
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Q1 (N = 804): Thinking about a time when you were a First Officer /
Second-in-Command, how many instances in an average year have you
hesitated about speaking up regarding safety because of something the
Captain / Pilot-in-Command said or did in the flight deck?
Q2 (N = 808): Thinking about a time when you were a First Officer /
Second-in-Command, how many instances in an average year did you feel
silenced after bringing up a safety concern because of something the
Captain / Pilot-in-Command said or did in the flight deck?
Q3 (N = 718): When flying with someone you haven't flown with before,
what is one thing that they can do to create a trip culture where you feel
included, valued, and comfortable to speak up?
Participants
The survey participants were predominantly trained and/or are currently
operating aircraft in the United States (85%, USA N=695 / Non-USA N=119). The
majority (86%) either had previous experience operating as Captain in a crew
environment or were currently operating as a Captain (Captain N=695, no Captain
experience N=122). While gender and race are not explored specifically in this
study, we acknowledge that 27.6% (N=217) of survey respondents self-identified
as a woman and 64% self-identified as straight, white, and male (N=504). More
than two thirds of survey respondents (68.4%) had more than 5000 flight hours
(>5000 flight hours N=555, <5000 flight hours N=256).
Analysis
We analyzed responses to Q1 and Q2 through a quantitative approach to
investigate trends of muted safety voice and safety silence. We reviewed the
frequency with which pilots hesitated sharing safety-pertinent information or felt
silenced after doing so. We then compared the responses across the pilot position
variable - Captain versus First Officer. We supplemented these findings with a
qualitative analysis of responses to Q3 using a grounded theory approach
(Charmaz, 2006). Through an iterative process that included comparison within and
across data sets and through theoretical sampling, we generated theory.
Findings
Through the grounded theory process, we categorized emergent themes
around several ways in which First Officers felt undervalued, micromanaged, and
uncomfortable, as well as various ways in which Captains exerted power in the
flight deck. These themes collectively contributed to the experiences of First
Officers’ feeling discomfort in activating safety voice and oftentimes resulting in
safety silence.
First Officers’ Muted Safety Voice and Feeling Silenced
Our quantitative analysis of the responses to Q1 and Q2 are contained in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. From Table 1, we observed that a majority of current
First Officers (66.4%, N = 79/119) and current Captains reflecting on their time as
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First Officers (67.2%, N = 460/685) hesitated about speaking up regarding safety
between 1-10 times a year. Similarly, from Table 2, we observed that a majority of
current First Officers (51.2%, N = 62/119) and current Captains reflecting on their
time as First Officers (52.1%, N = 358/685) felt silenced 1-10 times a year after
bringing up a safety concern. Collectively, we observe broad trends of First Officers
feeling uncomfortable in bringing up safety concerns or being silenced after doing
so. Having observed this trend, we examine ways in which the flight deck
microculture influenced their selection of safety silence or participation in muted
safety voice through our qualitative analysis of Q3.
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Table 1
Comparing Captains’ and FOs’ Responses to Q1
Q1. Thinking about a time when you were a First Officer / Second-in-Command, how many
instances in an average year have you hesitated about speaking up regarding safety because
of something the Captain / Pilot-in-Command said or did in the flight deck?
First Officers (N=119)

Captains (N=685)

Aggregated (N= 804)

N value

Percentage

N value

Percentage

N value

Percentage

0
instances:
Never
happened

27

22.7%

168

24.5%

195

24.2%

1 – 10
instances a
year

79

66.4%

460

67.2%

539

67%

11 – 30
instances a
year

12

10%

39

5.7%

51

6.3%

31 – 50
instances a
year

1

0.8%

12

1.7%

13

1.6%

More than
50
instances a
year

0

0%

6

0.9%

6

0.7%
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Table 2
Comparing Captains’ and FOs’ Responses to Q2
Q2 (N=808): Thinking about a time when you were a First Officer / Second-in-Command, how
many instances in an average year did you feel silenced after bringing up a safety concern because
of something the Captain / Pilot-in-Command said or did in the flight deck?
First Officers (N=121)

Captains (N=687)

Aggregated N = (808)

N value

Percentage

N value

Percentage

N value

Percentage

0
instances:
Never
happened

52

43%

292

42.5%

344

42.7%

1 – 10
instances a
year

62

51.2%

358

52.1%

420

52.2%

11 – 30
instances a
year

4

3.3%

25

3.6%

29

3.6%

31 – 50
instances a
year

1

0.8%

4

0.6%

5

0.6%

More than
50
instances a
year

2

1.6%

8

1.2%

10

1.2%

First Officers Feeling Undervalued, Micromanaged, and Uncomfortable
First Officers reported on their experiences feeling undervalued,
micromanaged, and uncomfortable by Captains in their roles on the flight deck. A
primary way this manifested was Captains treating them like they were inept at
their jobs by needing a lot of direction in order to do very basic things (e.g.,
micromanaging). Some illustrative comments from First Officers' responses to Q3
(N=718) highlight these findings:
Comment 1: “Don’t act like I have to be taught how to fly again, just
because I am a FO.”
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Comment 2: “Do not throw out commands in a military way during preflight.”
Comment 3: “Allow me to do my job. While the PIC is responsible and
needs to oversee the safety of the operation, the FO must also be allowed
and trusted to do his or her own job.”
In these examples, First Officers talked about feeling disrespected by
Captains due to the assumption that they were not trained professional or good at
their job. Additionally, there is an element of infantilization in these remarks. First
Officers can sometimes feel as if they do not have the agency to fully execute their
roles.
Beyond being treated as amateurs at their jobs, some First Officers also
spoke about how Captains made comments that they found personally intrusive or
offensive. Some examples follow.
Comment 4: “Don’t be a cocky jerk. Don’t make misogynistic jokes.”
Comment 5: “Don’t bring gender bias in the cockpit.”
Comment 6: “Stop berating woman and gays.”
From these comments, we observed First Officers being made to feel
uncomfortable on the flight deck by misogynistic and inappropriate comments from
Captains. Such comments make it difficult for First Officers to focus fully on doing
their jobs to the best of their abilities since they must expend cognitive energy
processing (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007) or feel stigmatized by the comments (Pinel,
1999).
In our survey, we sought to compile a list of recommendations for creating
a pro-safety voice culture where First Officers felt comfortable speaking up and
sharing safety-pertinent data. Suggestions indicate that First Officers want to feel
valued and appreciated, as seen in the following comments:
Comment 7: “Asking for my opinion and listening to me makes me feel part
of the crew, not a burden on the Captain. Involve me in the briefings - to
cabin crew and in the flight deck”
Comment 8: “solicit input and listen to suggestions. Ask my opinion and
include me on the team”
First Officers indicated a desire to build rapport, or a sense of community, prior to
conducting the trip:
Comment 9: “establish easygoing rapport before the flight. Preflight
conversation, such as the ‘cup of coffee’ chat and introductions. A friendly
smile first thing makes all the difference.”
Along similar lines but on a broader scale, First Officers were looking to find
commonalities or shared vulnerabilities:
Comment 10: “in the preflight briefing, admit own proneness to
confirmation bias, feeling hurried, and blunder-error. Fundamentally: state
that safety is the priority, not ego gratification”
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Comment 11: “admit that you can make mistakes, and that there are no
stupid questions.”
These suggestions indicate First Officers believe that it is possible for
Captains to create a trip culture where they are encouraged to speak up, rather than
feeling undervalued or micromanaged.
These comments indicate that First Officers can sometimes feel left out of
conversations, underutilized, and ignored. We find that some First Officers
experience trip cultures laden with discomfort and uncertainty, where they feel
underappreciated and unfairly treated. Thus, we envision an improvement to CRM
training to incorporate our recommendations to improve such cultures. Crew
Resource Management may have been built on the assumption that the flight deck
is an inclusive environment, but our findings reveal that baseline CRM assumptions
do not match reality.
Captains Exerting Power
CRM training is intended to instill the belief in Captains and First Officers
that flying requires good team dynamics, where no one can “perform it effectively
without help from the other team members” (EUROCONTROL, 2022). However,
several First Officers spoke about their experiences with Captains exerting
hierarchies of power by virtue of their designation or experience. Below are some
examples of such situations.
Comment 12: “Occasionally overbearing captains will do things that are
the FO’s job because they are the PIC and think they are better than the
FO.”
Comment 13: “Don't act like a jerk. This is obviously not a thing that
captains think is important.”
In these examples, we saw First Officers being made to feel inferior on the
flight deck, which negatively impacts their abilities to do their jobs effectively and
can lead to muted safety voice or safety silence. A series of accidents where
unprofessional behavior and poor leadership were contributing factors (e.g.,
Northwest Airlink Flight 3701, Continental Connection Flight 3407, Corporate
Airlines BAE Systems BAE-J3201 in Missouri) led the Federal Aviation
Administration to publish an Advisory Circular defining leadership and
necessitating airline Captains be trained on how to be leaders (FAA AC 121-41,
2020). The Advisory Circular explains that leadership is a “proactive process”
where Captains must operate in a professional manner in accordance with standard
operating procedures (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020, p. 5).
In our survey, 93% of Captains and First Officers agreed that Captains are
responsible for setting the tone on the flight deck and establishing the norms of a
trip culture. First Officers are expected to adopt and adhere to said culture. With
the onus on Captains to set the tone (Casner & Schooler, 2015; FAA, n.d.a), First
Officers drew on their experiences to provide some suggestions on how Captains
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could work towards creating a more collaborative flight deck with stronger crew
dynamics:
Comment 14: “Engage crew by asking their input/opinions before
expressing his own. Collective pronouns (we, us) also help get everyone
onboard!”
Comment 15: “Use words like ‘we’. Actively include me in the decisions.”
Comment 16: “Ask me to speak up, with assurance that it would be valued.”
Comment 17: “Put it on the table in the briefing that you are open to
feedback and communication. Emphasis on cockpit operations as a team.
Be approachable.”
Comment 18: “On first brief of the trip, include some phraseology that says,
‘I’m not perfect, nor do I expect you to be either, so please if you see
something, say something; we can always talk about it after we land.’”
These suggestions speak toward a call for establishing a culture of humility,
empathy, and inclusivity on the flight deck. While this may be the ultimate goal of
Crew Resource Management, there is a disconnect in how it is operationalized.
The Inclusive Captain Culture
We also received comments from Captains about their own efforts in
creating an equitable trip culture. Some illustrative examples are shown below.
Comment 19: “I tell them to feel free and speak up, I'm no better, and I
make mistakes too. The only reason I am Captain is because I'm senior, not
better.”
Comment 20: “It is my job to include my SICs and ensure they understand
that their active participation and input is both appreciated and expected at
all times.”
Comment 21: “Start off by fostering open communication. Not bring about
who’s right but what’s right.”
Comment 22: “Put yourself on the same level as your FO/SIC. When you
both can act as adults toward each other without creating a weird power
dynamic, everyone will be more relaxed and open to the other. Be humble.”
Comment 23: “I always start with ‘We are a crew. Neither of us is infallible
so feel free to question anything that you aren’t sure about or that you aren’t
comfortable with. I’ll do the same.’”
In these examples, we see effective strategies adopted by Captains in
creating a more welcoming and equitable trip culture. In this light, First Officers
may be more comfortable voicing their safety concerns if any arise.
Discussion
First Officers’ Barriers to Speaking Up
Based on Crew Resource Management training, First Officers are expected
to speak up when they notice potential safety concerns (EUROCONTROL, 2022).
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From a Captain's perspective, safety silence from the First Officer would be seen
as a violation of CRM. This assumption makes it the responsibility of the First
Officer to deal with whatever barriers prevent them from speaking up. The design
of the system (CRM) assumes that the flight deck is a psychologically safe
environment where First Officers are valued for speaking up and where Captains
actively listen (safety listening). However, our findings indicate that this is not the
reality for all First Officers. Captains heavily influence the flight deck microculture,
which, in turn, impacts the likelihood that First Officers feel empowered to share
safety concerns.
We observe that several First Officers feel undervalued and micromanaged
in the flight deck. They mention being treated as if they need to be “taught how to
fly again” (see comment 1) and/or are bossed around disrespectfully, “[not] allowed
and trusted to do his or her own job” (see comment 3). Such flight deck
microcultures create environments of discomfort for First Officers, where they do
not feel valued as team members. This phenomenon results in their self-silencing
as a manifestation of low psychological safety (Edmondson, 2018). Our
quantitative analysis indicated that 75.8% (N=609) of pilots participate in muted
safety voice every year because of a negative tone established by the Captain. More
alarmingly, 57.3% (N=461) of pilots feel silenced after bringing up a safety
concern.
While this is not at all a novel finding in the field, as Bienfield and Grote
(2012) found that First Officers were the least likely to speak up behind Captains
and flight attendants, we believe that it is a significant finding because it continues
to be an unresolved problem. Our findings across a large number of pilots currently
active in the industry further heighten the need to rectify this situation.
Our surveyed First Officers believe that the Captain has an important role
to play in establishing a psychologically safe culture where everyone feels valued
as a team member. To this end, we recommend that Captains take more active roles
in establishing an inclusive and safe work environment. Some steps to do so could
be to use collective ‘we’ pronouns during preflight briefings and conduct postflight
debriefs to foster open communication by establishing that their input is valued,
and dispelling attitudes of their own infallibility or perfection. In these ways, and
others, Captains can take more initiative in establishing a flight deck microculture
where First Officers feel psychologically safe to speak up about safety concerns.
Implications for CRM training
Our findings have implications for the current standards of Crew Resource
Management training, as we observe a gap between the intended goals of CRM
training and its practical phenomenology as experienced by industry pilots. While
the intended goal of CRM training is to empower First Officers to “not assume that
other people have noticed a problem” and “speak out and not make the problem
worse by keeping it to yourself” (EUROCONTROL, 2022), there is a disconnect
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between this and how such situations actually transpire in the flight deck. In reality,
we find current CRM training insufficient as a tool to generate psychological safety
in the flight deck. This lack of training results in First Officers reporting feeling
unable to speak up due to a culture where they are made to feel inferior,
underappreciated,
undervalued,
uncomfortable,
micromanaged
and
psychologically unsafe.
Crew resource management was a system designed to improve aviation
safety by preventing and managing errors, but the system was designed on the
assumption that the flight deck was a psychologically safe environment where
safety voice was welcomed, and safety listening was the norm. Our findings reveal
these assumptions are not reality. Therefore, it is the system itself that must receive
the spotlight. The disconnect between the ethos of CRM and its phenomenology,
as explored through industry pilot feedback, highlights an imminent need to update
training methods.
Further research on ways to train pilots on psychological safety as a subset
of Crew Resource Management training may enhance the efficacy of the system
itself.
Conclusion
This study lays the groundwork for exploring social norms and
microcultures within flight decks and how these subcultures moderate the efficacy
of existing safety systems, such as CRM. The recent FAA requirement for air
carriers to conduct leadership training (§ 121.429) augments our findings of a
system in need of redesign. However, further research should focus both on a
standardized CRM training curriculum (social psychology and behavioral science
research to promote collaborative behaviorism and interpersonal skills) and a
pedagogical approach that elicits continuous learning. It is through this twopronged approach that we believe that our human-centered data will enhance
aviation safety.
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